Abstract: Semi-parliamentary government is analyzed as a distinct executivelegislative system which mirrors semi-presidentialism. It exists when the legislature is divided into two equally legitimate parts, only one of which can dismiss the prime minister in a no-confidence vote. This system has distinct advantages over pure parliamentary and presidential systems: it can achieve a stable balance between different visions of democracy without reducing the programmatic capacities of political parties. The article analyzes approximations of semi-parliamentary government in Australia and Japan and compares empirical tradeoff patterns in the Australian Commonwealth as well as New South Wales to 20 advanced parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies. New semiparliamentary designs are discussed, some of which do not require formal bicameralism. Special attention is given to semi-parliamentary options for democratizing the European Union.
INTRODUCTION
Almost 40 years ago Maurice Duverger (1980) defined the concept of semipresidential government and analyzed the diversity of practices in what was then only a small set of semi-presidential countries (see also Elgie 2011) . I argue that a similar analysis is needed for the concept of semi-parliamentary government. I propose to understand the latter as the mirror image of the former. A semipresidential system divides the executive into two equally legitimate parts, only one of which -the prime minister -depends on assembly confidence for its survival in office. Conversely, a semi-parliamentary system divides that the assembly into two equally legitimate parts, only one of which possesses the power to dismiss the prime minister in a no-confidence vote.
1 It establishes a formal separation of power between the executive and one part of the assembly. The two parts of the assembly do not need to be separate houses but can be defined by the electoral system. 2 I contend that semi-parliamentary government deserves attention from institutional designers, as it has the potential to balance competing "visions" of democracy (Powell 2000) . 1 The term semi-parliamentarism has been used occasionally and inconsistently for executive-legislative systems that are generally labelled differently (Linz 1994 : 48-9, Sartori 1994 : 110, Fabbrini 2001 ).
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Since all existing semi-parliamentary systems are bicameral, I will often refer to lower and upper houses even when the reasoning also applies to two parts within a unicameral assembly.
Of course, other institutional designs can balance these different visions, too, but they have specific limits and downsides. In pure parliamentary systems, balancing efforts focus on proportional electoral systems that limit the number of parliamentary parties and/or induce these parties to form two competing blocs (Shugart 2001, Carey and Hix 2011) . As recent experiences in countries like Germany, Italy or Spain demonstrate, however, even optimized electoral institutions do not protect parliament systems against cabinet instability, failed cabinet formations or unwanted Grand Coalitions.
Pure presidential systems may achieve a more stable balancing of different visions of democracy by giving voters two elected but separated agents.
Presidential elections allow voters to directly select a stable government, whereas legislative elections can better achieve local and/or proportional representation (Shugart and Carey 1992 , Colomer and Negretto 2005 , Cheibub 2006 ). However, by concentrating executive power in a single individual rather than a collective (a party), presidential systems tend to increase personalism and weaken parties' programmatic capacities (Carey 2007, Samuels and Shugart 2010) . Moreover, efforts to keep individualized executive power in check justify institutional rules such as term limits, which reduce electoral accountability. Between 1946 Between -1996 almost three-fourth of all presidents in office could not serve another term, so that they could neither be rewarded nor sanctioned for their performance in office (Cheibub 2009 (Cheibub : 1380 .
I explore semi-parliamentarism as an option for creating a stable balance between normative design goals without some of the downsides of presidentialism. If the assembly is divided into two equally legitimate parts, only one of which can dismiss the prime minister, this part of the assembly can be designed in line with the "majoritarian" or Westminster vision of democracy (broadly understood). Voters can select a stable cabinet in a quasi-direct manner, but the prime ministers can be re-elected without limits and removed at any time by his or her party. The part of the assembly whose majority is fused with the executive becomes a sort of permanent "confidence college", so that party-based and programmatic electoral accountability can be maintained. At the same time, the separated part of the assembly -without the right to dismiss the prime minister -can be designed to maximize representativeness and act like a true legislature. It can deliberate on individual pieces of legislation and achieve horizontal accountability of the executive.
One way to think about the resulting system is that it institutionalizes the kind of legislative process associated with (substantial) minority cabinets in parliamentary systems. It stabilizes such cabinets and gives voters the power to more-or-less directly select a single party charged with the task of organizing issue-or dimension-specific legislative coalitions. It constitutes a separation-ofpower system that is majoritarian rather than super-majoritarian.
While semi-parliamentarism is to some extent a theoretical possibility, empirical approximations exist in a number of democracies, most notably in if the third is also fulfilled, it is called strong.
Australian bicameralism is certainly symmetric and strong, but it is more than that. While all Australian upper houses are directly elected, this is not required for symmetry (Lijphart 2012: 192-200) . The German and Dutch upper houses are considered symmetric even though the latter is indirectly elected and the former directly represents state governments. While all Australian upper houses have an absolute veto over (non-budgetary) legislation, this is also not required for symmetry. Japan's upper house is deemed symmetric even though its suspensive veto can be overruled by a two-thirds majority, and in Germany the absolute veto only applies to less than half of all laws (Stecker 2016) . Finally, the concepts of "symmetric" or "strong" bicameralism neglect executive-legislative relations.
This is in line with the general convention in political science to classify a country's executive-legislative system based on the "lower" house alone. Yet this convention is untenable, in my view, if both houses are directly elected and otherwise equal with respect to democratic legitimacy. In this case, a country's executive-legislative system depends on both chambers, and strong bicameralism can co-exist with -or constitute -drastically different systems. (Shugart and Carey 1992) . The types come in three logical pairs, which are discussed in turn.
[ (Ottolenghi 2001) .
The third pair also mixes elements of parliamentary and presidential government, but it does so by dividing either the executive or the assembly into two parts with equal democratic legitimacy. In semi-presidentialism a fixed-term president is legitimized through popular (direct) elections, but there is also a prime minister dependent on parliamentary confidence (Elgie 2011) . If there are two equally legitimate houses, both must be able to dismiss the prime minister, as is the case in Romania (Apahideanu 2014: 84) . Finally, in semi-parliamentarism both parts of the assembly (both houses) are legitimized though direct election, but the prime minister and her cabinet are dependent on the confidence of only one of them (author citation). In both hybrids, there is only a partial dependence of the executive on the assembly's confidence: either only a part of the executive is dependent on confidence (semi-presidentialism), or only a part of the assembly needs to provide this confidence (semi-parliamentarism).
To specify the concept of semi-parliamentarism further, I follow the existing literature and distinguish between a minimal definition and an ideal-type (Strøm 2000 , Cheibub et al. 2014 . The proposed minimal definition builds on Table   1: 1. There are no popular elections of the chief executive or head of state.
2. The assembly has two parts both of which are directly elected.
3. The executive's survival depends on the confidence of one part of the assembly, but not the other.
This minimal definition does not include any requirements about the legislative power of the upper house, especially its veto power. This is in line with the most recent literature on executive-legislative systems. While earlier work on presidentialism and semi-presidentialism views the formal powers of the president as a defining attribute (Duverger 1980, Shugart and Carey 1992) , more recent work does not (Elgie 2011 , Cheibub et al. 2014 ). Yet legislative power is certainly important. I argue below that the ideal-type of semiparliamentarism requires that at least the separated part of the assembly (the upper house) have absolute veto power over all (non-budgetary) legislation.
Note also that the suggested minimal definition rules out popular executive elections, but there is no reason why a country cannot be semi-presidential and semi-parliamentary at the same time. This more complex hybrid exists in the Czech Republic, which has a directly elected fixed-term president, a prime minister dependent on lower house confidence and a directly elected upper house without any power over the cabinet. However, neither the Czech president nor the upper house are formally powerful (Roberts 2006 , Hloušek 2015 .
Based on the minimal definition, we can identify seven semi-parliamentary democracies: the Australian Commonwealth, five Australian states and Japan. The next section gauges how well these cases approximate a particular ideal-type of semi-parliamentarism.
EMPIRICAL OVERVIEW: THE SEMI-PARLIAMENTARY IDEAL-TYPE AND ITS APPROXIMATIONS
This section constructs an ideal type that is more demanding than the proposed minimal definition but still focused on the most crucial institutional features. I
postulate that in an ideal-typical semi-parliamentary system (1) the democratic legitimacy of the two parts of the assembly is fully equal, (2) the survival of the cabinet is fully independent from one part of this assembly and (3) the absolute (non-budgetary) legislative veto power of this separated part of the assembly is not compromised in any way. Table 2 specifies six implications of this ideal-type, which are discussed in turn.
[ Upper house confidence. By the definition of semi-parliamentarism, all upper houses considered here lack a no-confidence vote. However, an absolute veto over the budget may be used as a de facto no-confidence vote. New South Wales, Victoria and Japan lack an absolute budget veto and thus come closer to the idealtype. 6 The other cases have an absolute budget veto and deviate more from it. they lack a no-confidence vote. The existence or lack of confidence authority does not matter for democratic legitimacy but for the executive-legislative system. For the empirical analysis, though, the path-dependent cultural context certainly matters and must be taken into account when we draw lessons for other democracies.
THEORY: SEMI-PARLIAMENTARISM AND THE INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN OF DEMOCRACY
This section analyzes theoretically the potential of semi-parliamentarism to balance conflicting goals in the institutional design of democracy. My starting point is the seminal study of Shugart and Carey (1992: Chap. 1). It focuses on basic tradeoffs in the institutional design of democracy and argues that a parliamentary system of government exacerbates them. As voters elect only one agent, parliament, which then selects a cabinet, a stark tradeoff emerges between an "efficient" government and a "representative" assembly. The authors' notion of efficiency relates to the so-called "majoritarian" or Westminster model of democracy (Powell 2000 , Lijphart 2012 . Their particular focus is on identifiability, i.e., "the ability of voters to identify the choices of competing potential government that are being presented to them in electoral campaigns" (Shugart and Carey 1992: 9) . "Representativeness" has two different aspects.
First, the institutional logic of parliamentarism weakens local representation.
National policy concerns expressed by parties become paramount and the "assembly formally constructed to represent local interests … becomes principally an 'electoral college' for determining which party holds executive power" (ibid.:
10-11). Second, even if representation is understood solely in terms of programmatic party platforms, parliamentary government creates a strong tradeoff in the choice of the electoral system. A highly proportional electoral system leads to a representative assembly but thereby tends to undermine identifiability.
To be sure, it has been argued that pure parliamentary systems can be designed to achieve an optimized balance between conflicting goals. One prominent optimization idea is to use mixed or bonus-adjusted electoral systems in order to achieve bipolar competition between two competing blocs of proportionally elected parties (Shugart 2001) , another is proportional representation (PR) with small district magnitudes (Carey and Hix 2011) .
However, recent experiences in countries like Germany, Italy or Spain demonstrate that our ability to "engineer" stable patterns of party competition through the electoral system is limited. With the emergence of new (partly antisystem) parties, these countries have been unable to maintain bipolar competition, which led either to unwanted Grand Coalitions or to severe problems in building and stabilizing cabinets (e.g., Poguntke and von Dem Berge 2014 , Pasquino and Valbruzzi 2015 , Medina 2016 ). Shugart and Carey (1992: 12-15) argue that presidential systems may facilitate the balancing of conflicting design goals by allowing voters to elect two separate agents: popular elections of a fixed-term president are inherently majoritarian and thus can achieve identifiability and efficiency -regardless of the fragmentation of the party system in the assembly (see also Cheibub 2006) . At the same time, assembly elections can be designed to achieve geographical and/or ideological representativeness.
Yet presidential systems have one major disadvantage: they tend to undermine the programmatic capacities of political parties (Samuels and Shugart 2010) .
Since executive power is concentrated in a single individual who does not require assembly confidence, political parties lose much of their control over presidential candidates, both before and after the election. Furthermore, this concentration has undesirable downstream implications for constitutional designs. Most notably, it helps to justify constitutional limits on the reelection of presidents, which greatly reduce electoral accountability and give last-term presidents an incentive to circumvent the constitution (Carey 2003 , Cheibub 2009 : 1380 .
My argument is that a semi-parliamentary system has a similar potential to balance democratic design goals, while being more conducive to programmatic parties, electoral accountability and constitutional loyalty. In semiparliamentarism, too, voters elect two agents: the two parts (houses) of the assembly. Hence, the part of the assembly whose majority is fused with the cabinet (the lower house) can be oriented towards the goals of "majoritarian" Second, institutional designers can avoid these pressures by ensuring a similar or identical composition of the two houses, as they have done, for long periods of time, in Belgium and Italy. Yet if congruence is necessary to stabilize bicameralism, the upper house cannot achieve more "representativeness" after all.
One last point should be noted. Political theorists often view strong bicameralism as largely equivalent to super-majoritarian decision-rules (e.g., 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: SEMI-PARLIAMENTARY DESIGNS IN AUSTRALIA AND THEIR PERFORMANCE
This section analyzes the specific designs of semi-parliamentarism in Australia (see Table 3 ) and analyzes aspects of their performance in comparison with parliamentary systems. 8 I briefly discuss the Tasmanian focus on local 8
As argued above, semi-parliamentarism's main advantage over presidentialism has to do with parties. The strong discipline and programmatic representation in the upper house and then turn to the more common focus on proportional representation.
Balancing party-programmatic and local-individualist representation
Tasmania uses semi-parliamentarism to achieve local, non-partisan representation in the upper house (Sharman 2013) . Alternative vote in singlemember districts is one important element of this design; staggered yearly elections and a small assembly size are others (Table 3) As to the tradeoff between "majoritarian" and "proportional" goals, Tasmania adopts the above-mentioned compromise solution of using PR in small districts in the lower house (five members since 1998). Indeed, it manages to have both a low effective number of legislative parties and low empirical disproportionality (Table   3) .
nature of the Australian parties are well-established (but see Gauja 2015) . On the case of Japan, see Thies and Yanai (2014) .
[TABLE 3 AROUND HERE]
Balancing "majoritarian" and "proportional" democracy
The more prevalent approach of using the semi-parliamentary constitution exists in the other bicameral polities in Australia (Table 3) The three "proportional" goals are as follows. Gallagher's (1991) disproportionality index for the more proportional house. and "left" on others -then "representativeness" requires that this multidimensionality be reflected or constructed in the assembly (e.g.
Proportionality (Prop): This indicator is the inverse of

Stecker and Tausendpfund 2016)
. 11 We use expert survey data by Benoit 10 We do not use an institutional measure of electoral systems here, because we do not want to bias the analysis against the "sweet spot" argument advanced by Carey and Hix (2011) .
11 The theoretical variable of interest is how much institutions reduce the dimensionality of preferences in the assembly relative to that in the electorate or to some counterfactual standard. Actual dimensionality is the best proxy available.
and Laver (2006) as well as Pörschke (2014) to compute an effective number of dimensions (author citation) in the house with higher dimensionality.
3. Legislative flexibility (Flex): One way to allow potentially all parties in the assembly to participate in decision-making is to seek flexible, issuespecific coalitions rather than establishing the members of a portfolio coalition as veto players (Powell 2000: 256, n.9, Ward and Weale 2010) .
The indicator measures the extent to which governments commit themselves to a fixed coalition or remain free to choose between different support parties. suggest that this is less an inherent limitation of the semi-parliamentary 13 The other Australian states could not be included because we lack comparative data on party positions and hence on the dimensionality of the assembly.
constitution but a result of the path-dependent designs that evolved in Australia.
Most notably, the effective number of parties and dimensions is probably limited by the small sizes and/or district magnitudes of upper houses (Taagepera 2007 would be similar to a presidential election, except that the elected prime minister remained responsible to his or her party as well as to the majority in the lower house. All voters' preference rankings would matter for selecting the majority party. Voters, whose first choice was not for one of the two seat-winning parties in the lower house, would still be proportionally represented in the upper house.
As noted, bicameralism is not a necessary condition for semi-parliamentarism. 
Clarity of Responsibility
Duration-weighted average of cabinet types, based on the following ranking: 1 = single-party with majority in all directly elected houses .85 = single-party with majority in lower house only .66 = multi-party with majority in all directly elected houses .50 = multi-party with majority in lower house only .33 = single-party minority 0 = multi-party minority Döring and Manow (2016) for lower houses, Eppner and Ganghof (2016) for upper houses. Own data collection for New South Wales.
Cabinet Stability
Average length of a cabinet divided by the constitutionally maximal term length. A new cabinet begins when elections take place or the party composition of the cabinet changes. Döring and Manow (2016) , own data collection on constitutional term lengths and on New South Wales. Proportionality Inversed Gallagher (1991) index for the more proportional house, elections weighted by length of the following term. Best and Zhirnov (2015) and own data collection for New South Wales. Dimensionality Effective Number of Dimensions = Sum of the number of factors identified in a factor analysis of issue-specific party positions weighted by the size of the factors' eigenvalues -for the house with higher dimensionality. Party Benoit/Laver (2006) and, for New South Wales, Pörschke (2014) .
positions are based on expert surveys and do not vary over time. Flexibility Duration-weighted average of cabinet types, based on the following ranking: 0 = majority cabinet .5 = formal minority cabinet 1 = substantial minority cabinet Values reflect the house with greater overall flexibility in the period under consideration. Strøm (1990) and Döring and Manow (2016) for lower houses, Eppner and Ganghof (2016) for upper houses, own data collection based on case-specific sources.
